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1. Introduction 
International agreements and regulations of intellectual property rights (IPR) are on the agen-
da of the world economic order since the 19th century. Thus, not only have IPR been viewed 
to constitute a cross-border economic problem that is closely related to trading goods, actually 
it has been viewed to represent a relevant problem for international economic governance on 
its own merits very quickly and early. At the same time, the design and shaping of interna-
tional rules of IPR have always been very controversial and consensus appeared to be impos-
sible for a long time – and in a way this has not changed to this day. As one of the conse-
quences, a multitude of forums dealing with international cooperation (of differing degrees) 
on IPR has emerged and partly disappeared again. Often, a new agenda was accompanied by 
establishing a new forum. Arguably the most powerful international initiative was put forward 
in the context of founding and establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. 
One of its – more controversial, however – pillars is the so-called TRIPS-agreement, covering 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights.
However, the – political as well as academic – debate on IPR has always not only been 
shaped by different opinions and interests of different players in different countries. In fact, 
the innovation dynamics of media markets, i.e. markets for information storage and transmis-
sion, have generated a dynamic evolution of the economic problems of cross-border IP trade 
and effects as well. From a focus on written media in the 19th century via the emergence of 
radio and television during the 20th century until the era of the internet and digitalized infor-
mation towards the end of the 20th century and during the still young 21st century, the eco-
nomic forces of dealing with media-codified IP have been subject to constant change, thereby, 
putting up frequent challenges to existing rules and practices. International governance appro-
priate to the written era may not fit with over-the-air broadcasting and the worldwide internet 
with digitalized content may render many of those rules obsolete once again. This is also true 
for TRIPS, which basically is rooted in the pre-digitalized and pre-internet era.  
IP fundamentally is about information and knowledge, which is stored and transmitted via 
media. Still, the economics of IP differ considerably depending on what kind of IP is ana-
lyzed. Technological innovation codified in patents, for instance, represent different challeng-
es from less-formally codified business secrets or commercial copyrights. Since it is virtually 
impossible to address all the different dimensions of IPR in such a brief paper and since 
commercial copyrights are more prone to the challenges of innovation dynamics through digi-
talization and, at the same time, have triggered some of the core WTO-TRIPS cases so far, 
this paper focuses on the international governance of commercial copyrights in the context of 
WTO TRIPS-agreement (sections 3 and 4) as well as new challenges to this governance (sec-
tion 5). Section 2 starts with summarizing some basic economics of IPR and commercial cop-
yrights, section 6 concludes. 
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2. Some Basic Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and Commercial 
Copyrights
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are an institutional construct that serves to create exclusive 
and individual property rights for defined creations of mind, namely intangible assets such as 
(i) literary, musical and artistic creations, (ii) inventions, as well as (iii and iv) phrases, sym-
bols and designs. Property of these immaterial goods is codified by law into specified rights 
like (i) copyrights, (ii) patents, (iii) trademarks, and (iv) industrial design (commercial secrets) 
rights. Although, our review on TRIPS and its current controversies (section 3) touches upon 
all of these areas, our main analysis (sections 2, 4 and 5) focuses on copyrights. At the end of 
the day, IPR protection and copyright systems are about institutional arrangements to organize 
information production and dissemination. 
From an economic perspective, individual and exclusive property rights on creations of mind 
are ambiguous regarding their effects on innovation dynamics (inter alia, Landes & Posner
1989; Koboldt 1995; Gordon & Watt 2003; Watt 2004; Schmidt 2010: 86-92; Belleflamme & 
Peitz 2012). On the one hand, strong IPR serve to internalize positive externalities (Hurt & 
Schuchman 1966). Without IPR, all these creations of mind would be free to be used for 
commercial purposes once they are ‘out’ without giving the creator any possibility to compre-
hensively appropriate the commercial benefits her creation brings to numerous ‘exploiters’. 
The important difference to ‘ordinary’ goods is constituted by the informational character of 
intellectual property: once information is known by someone, it cannot be taken back any-
more and its (commercial) use cannot be prevented anymore in the absence of IPR.1 The eco-
nomic downside of this positive externality lies in the lack of incentives to engage in intellec-
tual creations. If a creator cannot appropriate her share of commercial benefits resting upon 
her creation, then the incentive for undertaking the burdens and costs of creating activities are 
low. Or, more precisely, the economic (monetary) incentives are dysfunctional; it is still pos-
sible that creators are motivated by intrinsic incentives that are non-economic and non-
monetary by nature. However, as long as the sum of intellectual creations based on economic 
and intrinsic incentives is deemed to be larger than intellectual creations based on intrinsic 
incentives only, the conclusion holds that the absence of IPR harms innovation dynamics.  
Yet, there is another side to this story. Diffusion of intellectual creations and, thus, dynamics 
creating innovation by using the intellectual creations as an input are hampered and slowed 
down by IPR. A regime of imitation liberty creates more innovation dynamics from an initial 
creation by encouraging follow-on creations (Watt 2004). In the economic literature, granting 
IPR is often viewed to constitute an (artificial) monopoly for the intellectual creation that oth-
erwise would be free to use for everyone.2 As a consequence, solving the underproduction 
problem due to positive externalities generates an underutilization problem due to the market 
power of the creator (who is granted a monopoly privilege). The (artificial) monopoly power 
allows the creator not only to appropriate the revenues of her creation, it furthermore allows 

1 On theories of trade of information including critical assessments of marginal calculation approaches to infor-
mation trade Stigler (1961), Streit & Wegner (1989) and Kirzner (1992).  
2 This is the dominating approach when it comes to modeling copyrights and their effects. See the excellent liter-
ature review by Belleflamme & Peitz (2012). 

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her to set prices above marginal costs and to reap monopoly rents. This leads to welfare-
reducing rationing (Yoon 2002; Belleflamme & Peitz 2012).
However, from an institutional and competition economics-informed perspective, this prob-
lem is somewhat more complex. First of all, all property rights are institutional arrangements 
and as such social constructs. Defining property rights for information goods and creations of 
the mind by law is a priori neither more, nor less artificial or natural as defining property 
rights for any other type of (material) goods by law. Property rights always require a codified 
content specification, an utilization specification (including the limits to property rights) as 
well as commercial laws defining the trade  of these goods (conveyance or transfer of proper-
ty). Furthermore, implementing a court system and police forces in order to enforce the so-
cially defined property rights is fundamental. As such, property rights for intellectual goods 
do not constitute a special privilege for their owners in the context of a market economy sys-
tem.  
More intriguing, secondly, is the question whether IPR constitute a monopoly as it is predom-
inantly assumed in the economic literature on copyrights (overview: Belleflamme & Peitz
2012). It requires a rather abstract definition of a monopoly to come to this conclusion, 
though: only if every intellectual product is unique in the sense that it is not perfectly identical 
to other products, then exclusive and individual property rights on it create a monopoly. 
Again, under such a view, this would not represent a special characteristic of creations of the 
mind. It would be exactly the same with any other type of good: if the produced good was 
unique and no perfectly identical other product existed, exclusive property right on it would 
always create a monopoly. However, this is not how monopolies are usually defined in com-
petition economics. Instead, monopoly power only comes into existence if no substitute ex-
ists, which explicitly includes imperfect substitutes! Competition and antitrust economics 
have developed several techniques (including advanced and sophisticated econometric meth-
ods) to delineate a relevant market with heterogeneous goods (which exist much more wide-
spread than homogenous markets). Thus, whether IPR create monopolies depends on the ex-
istence of (perfect and imperfect) substitutes and does not represent an automatism – just like 
with any ‘ordinary’ good. For instance, a patent on a new technology or a new active pharma-
ceutical substance may actually represent a monopoly and allow for monopolistic behavior of 
the IPR holder. However, a new song by, say, Rihanna (or her songwriters) or a new crime 
thriller by any popular or not-so-popular author certainly fails any standard, state-of-the-art 
monopoly test since it stands in direct competition with other new pop songs and other new 
crime stories, respectively. Even though mainstream pop songs, for instance, are not identical, 
they obviously represent strong substitutes to pop music consumers.3 From an antitrust point 
of view, it would be more than strange to define a relevant market to consist of “Ai se eu te 
pego” by Michel Teló and nothing else and, at the same time, to claim that “Heart Skips a 
Beat” by Olly Murs or “Forgive Forget” by Caligola (taking the top three hits from itunes as 
these lines are written) constitute other, separate one-product markets.4 This cannot be aligned 

3 In line with that, songs at discount prices tend to rise in permanently renewed music charts (like itunes or ama-
zon download track charts) as long as they are discounted and some ‘official’ music charts (like in Germany) 
even account for this by ordering according to revenues and not ‘just’ according to quantities. 
4 See Schmidt (2010: 88) for a comparable reasoning for detective stories books. 
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with any common economic market delineation concept. Instead, any sensible relevant market 
delineation will include a multitude of songs, records, books, etc. that represent imperfect but 
close-enough substitutes to exert competitive pressure on each other. 
In other words, it requires a case-by-case analysis to conclude whether any given IPR consti-
tutes a monopoly – and in many cases this will not be the case. If a monopoly is constituted, 
then welfare-reducing exploitation of the related market power by the creator can be expected. 
Furthermore, IPR may in such cases be used to deter competition in related or neighboring 
markets and to leverage market power (Schmidt 2010).
In summary, IPR promote creations but may hamper their diffusion (depending on the com-
petitive situation). This trade-off may be alleviated (i) within the system of IPR, for instance  
 by the specific design of the protective content of IPR, 
 temporary protection rights (like existing patents and copyrights are typically shaped), 
or
 mandatory licensing of intellectual property (with regulated prices)
or (ii) by adopting some sort of imitation liberty regime and implementing an alternative 
compensation scheme for creators, like public alimentation (Koboldt 1995: 22).
3. The TRIPS Agreement 
3.1 History and Major Content 
Coming from such a system of imitation liberty accompanied by an informal system of ali-
menting creators by local authorities in medieval times, the development of todays wide-
spread IPR regimes only started during the 19th century (despite few earlier predecessors). In 
many areas of intellectual property, it was quite quickly realized that this area is specifically 
subject to cross-border effects. Information and information flow is much more difficult to 
regulate at territorial borders than trade with ‘ordinary’ goods – and this was true even before 
the emergence of the worldwide web (internet). Consequently, first attempts to establish in-
ternational rules on IPR date back to the late 19th century, e.g. United International Bureaux 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property established 1893 in Berne and relocated to Geneva 
in 1960. The development took an important step in 1967 when the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) succeeded the bureau as an agency of the United Nations. See fig. 
1 on the work and the development of WIPO. 


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Fig. 1: History of WIPO (source: www.wipo.int) 
Date Main happenings 
14.07.1967 Signing of the WIPO Convention, which officially establishes WIPO 
1970 WIPO comes into force 
19.06.1970 
Patent Cooperation Treaty 
 Provides the possibility to apply for patent protection in several 
member countries by filling one international form 
24.03.1971 
Strasbourg Agreement 
 Establishes the International Patent Classification, an overall system 
which creates transparency by systemizing the different branches of 
technology and providing each branch different codes 
20.10.1971 
Phonogram Convention 
 Provides a protection for phonogram producers in each Contracting 
State against the unauthorized duplication of phonograms and the 
importation and distribution of such duplicates. 
12.06.1973 Vienna Agreement  Establishes a classification of marks, containing figurative elements 
21.05.1974 
Brussels Convention 
 Provides the obligation for the Contracting Parties to prevent unau-
thorized distribution transmitted by satellite on or from its territory 
17.12.1974 WIPO becomes a specialized agency of the United Nations 
28.04.1977 
Budapest Treaty 
 Any Contracting State which allows or requires the deposit of micro-
organisms for patent procedures must recognize this deposit with any 
“international depositary authority” 
26.09.1981 
Nairobi Treaty 
 All Contracting States have to protect the Olympic symbol against 
commercial purposes not authorized by the International Olympic 
Committee 
26.05.1989 
Washington Treaty (not yet in force) 
 Gives Contracting Parties the obligation to secure intellectual proper-
ty protection connected to layout-designs (topographies) throughout 
their territories 
27.06.1989 
Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement 
 The Madrid Agreement (1891) makes it possible to protect a 
mark in several countries by obtaining an international registra-
tion
 The Protocol aims to make the Agreement more flexible and 
more compatible with the national legislation of countries who 
could not accept the Agreement itself 
27.10.1994 
Trademark Law Treaty 
 Aims to modernize national and regional trademark registration pro-
cedures by simplifying and standardizing certain features. 
01.01.1996 Cooperation Agreement between WIPO and WTO comes into force 
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20.12.1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (entering into force: 06.03.2002) 
 Provides additional copyrights for works which are not protected 
by the Berne Convention due to the development of technology 
(computer programs, databases) 
  Deals with wider rights of authors (right of distribution, rental 
and communication to the public) 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (entered into force 
05.02.2002) 
 Grants economic and moral rights to performers and producers of 
phonograms 
01.06.2000 
Patent Law Treaty (entered into force: 28.04.2005) 
 Aims to make patent procedures more ‘user-friendly’ 
 Provides a minimum standard which the Offices of Contracting 
Parties may apply 
27.03.2006 
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks 
 Provides a dynamic international framework for the harmonization of 
trademark registration procedures 
 Compared to the Trademark Law Treaty it has a wider scope for ex-
ample in communication technology 
Shortcomings regarding the binding character of WIPO provisions, the comprehensiveness of 
intellectual property protection, the territorial reach as well as enforcement mechanisms led to 
the U.S. as well as many other industrialized countries initiating IPR in the context of 
GATT/WTO. The Uruguay GATT round adopted the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which became a substantial part of the new-established 
World Trade Organization (WTO, 1995; see fig. 2).
“The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the so called 
TRIPS Agreement, is based on a recognition that increasingly the value of goods and services 
entering into international trade resides in the know-how and creativity incorporated into 
them. The TRIPS Agreement provides for minimum international standards of protection for 
such know-how and creativity in the areas of copyright and related rights, trademarks, geo-
graphical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits and un-
disclosed information. It also contains provisions aimed at the effective enforcement of such 
intellectual property rights, and provides for multilateral dispute settlement. It gives all WTO 
Members transitional periods so that they can meet their obligations under it. Developed-
country Members have had to comply with all of the provisions of the Agreement since 1 
January 1996. For developing countries and certain transition economies, the general transi-
tional period ended on 1 January 2000. For least-developed countries, the transitional period 
is 11 years (i.e. until 1 January 2006)” (WTO Annual Report 2001). 


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Fig. 2: History of TRIPS 
Date Main happenings 
01.01.1995 TRIPS Agreement officially comes into force (with given transitional periods for the Members) 
01.01.1996 TRIPS enters into force for developed countries 
9 – 13.12.1996 
1st WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Singapore 
 Decision about the monitoring of the implementation of the Agree-
ment – developed countries 
 Decision about the provision of financial and technical cooperation of 
developed countries with developing and least-developed Members 
 Decision about a review of the application of the provisions on geo-
graphical indications 
01.01.2000 
TRIPS enters into force for developing countries – with the possibility of 
prolonging the transitional period with 5 years if the preparation is not 
ready
9 – 14.11.2001 
4th WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Doha, Qa-
tar
 Doha Declaration 
 Looking for solutions in the question of the exportation of pharma-
ceuticals produced under compulsory licensing for countries with 
little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity 
 Extending the transitional period regarding pharmaceutical patents 
for least-developed countries until 01.01.2016 
 Setting the deadline for the end of negotiations regarding the multi-
lateral registration system for geographical indications of wines and 
spirits: 5th Ministerial Conference in 2003 
 Besides the reviews required by the TRIPS Agreement, further re-
views should also look at the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the UN Convention on Biodiversity, the protection 
of traditional knowledge and folklore and other developments 
 Solution needed to be found for ‘non-violation’ complaints – in the 
meantime it is not possible to initiate such complaints under TRIPS 
30.08.2003 
‘Waiver’ as a temporary solution for the issue regarding exportation of 
pharmaceutical products produced under compulsory licensing, making 
it easier for poorer countries to obtain cheaper generic versions of pa-
tented medicines  
10 – 14.10.2003 
5th WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Cancún, 
Mexico
The conference was supposed to be a mid-term evaluation of the Doha 
Development Agenda, however it ended without any consensus 
01.08.2004 
The ‘July package’ agreed, highlighting the need for more intensive 
negotiations regarding implementation issues related to the extension of 
the protection of geographical indications to products other than wines 
and spirits, reporting deadline: May 2005 
29.11.2005 The transition period is prolonged for least-developed countries. The new deadline: 01.07.2013 
10 

13 – 18.12.2005 
6th WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Hong Kong 
 Final decision in the question of patented pharmaceuticals: the ‘waiv-
er’ of 2003 transformed to a permanent amendment 
 Agreement that the Doha Work Programme needs to be completed by 
the end of 2006 
 The negotiations regarding the multilateral registration system for 
geographical indications of wines and spirits need to be finished 
 Efforts need to be doubled to find solutions for implementation is-
sues, such as the extension of the protection of geographical indica-
tions other than wines and spirits and the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the UN Convention on Biodiversity. These 
progresses need to be ready for review by 31.07.2006 
 Works regarding the ‘non-violation’ complaints need to be contin-
ued
30.11 – 02.12.2009 
7th WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Geneva 
The Members agreed not to bring ‘non-violation’ complaints to the 
WTO dispute settlement process until the final decision in the issue 
15 – 17.12.2011 
8th WTO Ministerial 
Conference, Geneva 
 ‘Non-violation’ complaints remain excluded from the WTO dispute 
settlement process until a final decision 
 Decision about the review of the request of least-developed countries 
for the extension of their transitional period. Final discussion of the is-
sue: 9th WTO Ministerial Conference, 2013 

The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is often 
called a minimum standards’ agreement due to the characteristic that it sets ‘only’ minimum 
requirements that the member countries have to meet but it provides space for them to imple-
ment laws and regulations which can provide better protection to intellectual property rights. 
The agreement and all the minimum standards follow three fundamental principles. Firstly, 
the principle of national treatment requires member countries to treat their own nationals and 
foreigners equally. Secondly, the most-favored-nation treatment requires equal treatment for 
the nationals of all WTO members and trading partners. While these first two principles rep-
resent the standard WTO principles, the third one is more specific directed to the TRIPS re-
gime stipulating that its provisions should contribute to and encourage technical innovation 
and technology transfer.
Besides these principles the TRIPS agreement provides regulation by the use of common-
ground rules which basically state that member countries have to follow the obligations of the 
most recent versions of the two most important agreements under the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO), namely the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty (in case of patents, industrial designs, etc.) and the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works (for copyrights). In cases where these treaties do not contain 
any relevant provisions or the ones contained are deemed to be inadequate, the TRIPS agree-
ment provides further standards for all fields of IP protection. 
 Copyrights and related rights: Members have to follow the regulations of Berne Con-
vention (except for that of moral rights). Computer programs need to be treated as lit-
erary works, databases should be protected by copyright (not the data or material it-
self). Authors of computer programs and films and producers of sound recordings 
have to be given the right to authorize or prohibit the commercial rental of their works 


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to the public. Performers and producers of sound recordings have to be protected from 
unauthorized recording and broadcast of live performances for a minimum of 50 years. 
Broadcasting organizations need to get such protection for 20 years. 
 Trademarks: Marks able to distinguish goods and service marks must be protected by 
trademark and the owner must be given exclusive rights to use. Marks which became 
well-known must enjoy further protection. A registered trade mark must be guaranteed 
for a period of at least 7 years. 
 Geographical indications: The highest level of protection must be given to wines and 
spirits. Members have to prevent the use of misleading indications. Exceptions can be 
used if a name already became a generic term in a country.  
 Industrial designs: Industrial designs must be protected for 10 years. 
 Patents: The provisions of the Paris Convention are valid. Moreover 20 years of patent 
protection must be available for all inventions in almost all fields of technology with 
three permissible exceptions: (i) if commercial use is prohibited because of public or-
ders or morality, (ii) in case of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals, as well as (iii) in case of plants and animals other 
than micro-organisms and essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. The applicant for 
the patent has to provide understandable (for experts) description of the invention and 
the production of it. Compulsory licensing and government use is allowed without the 
authorization of the right owner but the rights still need to be protected. 
 Layout designs of integrated circuits: The basic regulation is the Washington Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. Moreover protection must 
be given for at least 10 years. The rights need to be extended to articles incorporating 
infringing layout designs. Innocent infringers must be allowed to finish the use or 
sales of stock in hand which was ordered before knowing about the infringement. 
Government use is only allowed within strict regulations.
 Undisclosed information (trade secrets, know-how): Must be protected against unfair 
commercial activities. Materials about pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals 
waiting for marketing approval must also be protected. 
 Control of anticompetitive practices: If a country finds out that practices for protecting 
IPRs are anti-competitive it can ask for consultation for the other member. 
In contrast to many expectations, the inclusion of the TRIPS agreement into the WTO did not 
lead to a flood of complaints and cases (Pauwelyn 2010: 5-9). From 1st of January, 1995, and 
until the 20th of September, 2011, 29 out 427 (= 6.8 per cent) disputes filed under the WTO 
framework related to TRIPS. From these 29 cases filed, 9 (= 31 per cent) were brought to a 
panel. Panel decisions were appealed in again 33 per cent of cases, which is considerably be-
low the rate of appeals for panel decisions including all WTO areas (that is about 70 per cent). 
Furthermore, there is a downward trend in TRIPS disputes: 23 of 29 cases were filed in the 
period between 1996 and 2001 (in the first six years of TRIPS). During the last almost 11 
years, there have been only 6 TRIPS cases in total (see also fig. 3). Regarding the parties to 
the disputes, 9 out of 29 cases have been disputes brought by developed against developing 
12 
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countries, whereas 10 have been between the U.S. and the EU. The latter has been the most 
popular target (12 out of 29 complaints) so far – and the two most recent disputes saw devel-
oping countries bringing a case against developed countries. 
From these figures it can be concluded that TRIPS has not been an instrument of developed 
countries to fight developing ones to this day (Pauwelyn 2010: 8). While it is difficult to con-
clude anything about the adequacy of the number of cases, at least, it can be cautiously con-
cluded that TRIPS complaints and cases are not that much popular among WTO members. 
Surprisingly, TRIPS cases have rarely been about one company attacking another one for vio-
lating behavior, but more about attacks from one country on another country’s IPR laws 
(Pauwelyn 2010: 13-14). 

Sources: Pauwelyn (2010: 7) with additional data from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26#selected_agreement and 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
3.2 Current Developments 
At the moment and in the last couple of years there have been predominantly four main topics 
under discussion in the area of the TRIPS Agreement.5 These are negotiations regarding (i) 
geographic indications, (ii) incentives for technology transfer, (iii) ‘non-violation’ complaints 
as well as (iv) the protection of biodiversity and traditional knowledge. 

5 See for the following the WTO Annual Reports, different years. 
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3.2.1 Ongoing Negotiations Regarding Geographical Indications 
Geographic indications (GIs) are usually names of geographic places which can help to identi-
fy certain characteristics of different products. In general, GIs include information for con-
sumers not only about the place of origin but also contain signaling of quality and reputation 
standards of a given product.6 In the TRIPS Agreement, Art. 22 mandates all member coun-
tries to provide a standard level of protection for all products. This minimum standard must 
avoid misleading information of products about their GIs towards the public as well as the use 
of GIs for unfair competition7. Besides Art. 22, in case of wines and spirits, Art. 23 provides a 
higher level of protection, meaning that these products have to be protected even if the misuse 
of GIs would not cause any misleading of consumers or the public. In Art. 24, the agreement 
provides some exceptions regarding commonly used terms or long-standing practices and 
traditional names. 
In the area of GIs, there are two main issues debated: (i) implementing a multilateral register 
for wines and spirits and (ii) extending the higher level of protection for wines and spirits to 
other products as well. 
Regarding a multilateral register for wines and spirits, the key questions of the discussion are: 
what legal effect would a registration of a product have within member countries? To what 
extent this effect should apply to countries which are not part of the system? What about costs 
and benefits? The discussion traces back to an EU proposal. The general idea is that if a GI is 
registered, it establishes a “rebuttable presumption” that the term is to be protected in all 
WTO countries, unless a country makes a reservation within a specified period to be able to 
refuse protection. Many member states merely want to accept a voluntary system for the reg-
istration which would only be effective for countries opting to participate (Ahmad 2005). Re-
cently, a compromise proposal by Hong Kong and China surfaced that includes registration 
only on a voluntary basis, but the terms registered would enjoy a limited “presumption”. 
Regarding an extension of the higher level of protection beyond wines and spirits, the key 
questions of the debate are: does the Doha Declaration provide mandate for such negotia-
tions? Is it useful at all to extend the higher level of protection? If yes, to what extent? As the 
main interests in favor of such an extension, countries like Bulgaria, the EU, Guinea, India, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey argue that the extension would help them market their 
products more effectively and also to be able to differentiate them from competitors’ goods. 
In contrast, the opposing countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, Panama, Para-
guay, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei and the United States) emphasize that the existing level 
of protection is sufficient. The extension would be a burden and would cause problems with 

6 For more general discussions of geographical indications as intellectual property see, inter alia, Ilbert & Petit
(2009); Mulik & Crespi (2009); Kireeva & O’Connor (2010). 
7 In this case, the term ‘unfair competition’ explicitly relates to the WIPO related Paris Convention (in the 1967 
version), where Art. 10bis defines unfair competition as practices ‘contrary to honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters’. The article exemplarily cites false allegations, discrediting competitors as well as mis-
leading and confusing information about competitors.  
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the existing marketing practices. Basically they argue that the extension of GIs would be very 
harmful for producers who do not belong to the area which is protected by the GI. In their 
case, the resulting costs of developing and establishing new marketing strategies would in-
clude, inter alia, administration costs due to the name change and all the expenses they would 
need to spend on promotion (looking for new names, building trust of consumers, .etc.). 
Moreover, these established products would appear to be ’new’ for consumers without having 
the advantage of possessing innovative characteristics, thus eroding the investment in building 
up these brands and products and the accompanying reputation (WTO 2005). 
At the moment in both issues the Members try to get their interests closer to each other, how-
ever there is no agreement in sight yet (Ilbert & Petit 2009). 
3.2.2 Incentives for Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer is regarded by least-developed countries as part of the bargain in which 
they have agreed to protect intellectual property rights. Thus these countries regularly demand 
a more effective operation of technology transfer initiatives and incentive schemes. In gen-
eral, many different articles deal with the question of technology transfer. However, Art. 66 
(2) obliges developed countries to provide incentives for technology transfer. In order to make 
this system operate more effectively, the Doha Declaration states that developed countries 
must provide a detailed report by the end of each year which answers several questions re-
garding the operation of their incentive systems. 
As another part of these efforts, the WTO Secretariat has already organized workshops to dis-
cuss the issues and questions of technology transfer. Some of the developed-country members 
were invited to explain their incentive systems in detail. Moreover experts from both sides 
were able to discuss the operation of the system and how it could be improved. The basic idea 
behind these workshops was to achieve a broader understanding of the incentives and to pro-
vide a place for dialogue between the countries. At the same time other decisions under the 
TRIPS agreement have raised the question of technology transfer and, additionally, climate 
change negotiators have also started to discuss this topic. 
The major sources of technology transfer (TT) are usually said to be trade, licensing, foreign 
direct investment, joint ventures, the movement of people, etc. Basically two main types of 
TT are distinguished (Foray 2009; WTO 2011):
 packaged form: the technology is transferred through investments, im-
port of goods or building projects by foreign firms. In these cases, the 
transferred technology is a joint product or a by-product of another 
economic activity. 
 unpackaged form: technology is not transferred through a direct in-
vestment or trade but rather through licensing or collaboration con-
tracts, consultancy or joint ventures. In these cases, TT is the primary 
economic activity and not a ‘side-effect’. 
Examples for technology transfer under TRIPS include the following two programs (Foray
2009; WTO 2011): 


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 Collaboration between Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the UN’s 
Industrial Development Organization and many developing countries. 
o Swiss-supported Cleaner Production Centers (CPC) offer different services and 
solutions for clean technologies. CPCs are autonomous bodies, with their own 
boards, representing local industries and services; however, they are supported 
by a Swiss Reference Center – a distinguished institution in the relevant area. 
o The provided services are, for instance, information on the newest technolo-
gies, consultancies and special services, such as eco-audits, project evaluation, 
introduction to ISO standards, support in the investment projects, training, etc. 
o The CPCs also help local entrepreneurs to find solutions for financing technol-
ogies.
 US National Institutes for Health (NIH) support a “Global Research Initiative Pro-
gramme for New Foreign Investigators (GRIP)”. 
o The program supports the re-entry of NIH-trained foreign researchers into their 
home countries by providing partial salaries to these “returning home research-
ers” and by supporting their research projects. 
o The aim of this program is to enhance the scientific research infrastructure in 
developing countries, to stimulate research and to widen the efforts for finding 
solutions to global health issues. 
3.2.3 ‘Non-violation’ Complaints 
In the WTO and thus also under the TRIPS agreement if a member notices that another coun-
try has violated the Agreement or broke a commitment, it can turn to the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB). However the WTO also provides space for other kinds of complaints, namely 
the ‘non-violation’ ones when the ‘letters of the agreement’ do not get violated, however the 
member can show that it has been deprived of an expected benefit because of another coun-
try’s decision or action. These ‘non-violation’ complaints are possible in the case of goods 
and services in order to keep the balance of benefits. However in case of the TRIPS agree-
ment the picture looks more complicated. Originally, Art. 64 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement 
contained a five-year long moratorium on this question (meaning until 2000). Since then this 
moratorium has been extended from one ministerial conference to the following one and there 
has been no agreement about these kinds of complaints. 
The main questions of the controversial negotiations are: should ‘non-violation’ complaints be 
allowed in connection to intellectual property rights? If so, to what extent and how could the-
se issues be included in the WTO dispute settlement processes? Up to date there are some 
(e.g. the U.S. and Switzerland) who are positive towards this question and they would be open 
to negotiate the details of allowing ‘non-violation’ complaints under the TRIPS agreement. 
However until date there has been no consensus on the issue so the moratorium has been ex-
tended again until the ministerial conference of 2013. 
3.2.4 Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge 
The negotiations about the protection of biodiversity and traditional knowledge are based on 
two main topics. Firstly, Art. 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement deals with the patentability of 
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animal and plant inventions and the protection of new plant varieties. Moreover, since the 
Doha Declaration, the debates also include issues regarding the relationship between the 
TRIPS agreement and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as well as the pro-
tection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 
The debate centers on questions like whether and how TRIPS should do more to promote the 
CDB objective of equally sharing the benefits coming from the use of genetic resources in 
research and industry. The views of the different groups of members cover a wide range; 
however the main proposals focus mostly on amending the TRIPS agreement to require patent 
applicants to disclose the source providing genetic resources and the needed traditional 
knowledge. Most of the members inject their proposals about a special form of disclosure, 
either as a TRIPS obligation or through the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) 
or outside the patent law. There are other members, though, who would rather rely on national 
legislation, including contracts, than on a disclosure obligation. 
Views and ideas on the topic of the protection of biodiversity and traditional knowledge differ 
considerably and up to date there is no consensus in sight. However, all members agree that 
steps need to be taken to avoid erroneous patents and to equally share the benefits.
3.3 TRIPS and the Challenge of Commercial Copyrights 
Interestingly, the internally chosen agenda of development and reform projects within TRIPs 
(as discussed in this section 3) does not refer to the issue of cross-border enforcement of 
commercial copyrights. This represents an important fact in the light of two recent develop-
ments. Firstly, cross-border commercial copyrights have been an important enforcement prob-
lem within TRIPS so far (section 4) and, secondly, innovation dynamics in media markets 
create relevant new challenges for the international governance of this issue (section 5).
4. Selected Cases 
Fig. 4 lists the 9 cases that have been decided before a panel so far under the TRIPS agree-
ment. Pauwelyn (2010: 10-12) convincingly argues that most of these cases could also have 
been dealt with under the other WTO agreements, so that merely a small number of three cas-
es remains that represents the core of TRIPS decisions (grey-shaded in fig. 4). Among these 
cases, two are deemed specifically interesting because they touch on the core of intellectual 
property rights protection in the WTO framework. 


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Fig. 4: TRIPS Panel Cases 
PANEL REPORTS 
making TRIPS findings 
APPELLATE BODY REPORTS 
making TRIPS findings
1. India - Patent (US) India - Patent (US) Jan. 1998
2. Indonesia – Autos (EC, Japan, US) 
Jul. 1998 

3. India - Patent (EC) Sept. 1998 
4. Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents (EC) 
Apr. 2000 

5. US – Copyrights (EC) Jul. 2000  
6. Canada - Patent Term (US) Canada - Patent Term (US) Oct. 2000
7. US – Havana Club (EC) US - Havana Club (EC) Feb. 2002
8. EC – Trademarks & Geographical 
Indications (US/Australia) Apr. 2005



9. China – IP Rights Mar. 2009  
Source:Pauwelyn(2010:10).
4.1 China – IPR 
The first case is the China – Intellectual Property Rights case (WTO Dispute (DS362); China
2007; Fukunaga 2008: 911-918; Pauwelyn 2010: 12-13, 15, 33-35).8 On the 10th of April, 
2007, the United States submitted a complaint to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body which 
dealt with different aspects of the question of enforcing intellectual property rights in China 
and asked for consultations. After the submission of the complaint several WTO members 
joined the consultations and the WTO established a panel which was investigating the issues 
under debate. After more than one and a half year of consultations the final report was circu-
lated among the members. Regarding some of the complaints the panel found that the Chinese 
practices did not break the words of the law, however, in other cases rules and practices in 
China were ruled to be inconsistent with the obligations of the TRIPS agreement. 
The complaint submitted by the US was basically built around three main issues of intellectu-
al property rights. 
 Firstly, the US asked for consultation on the question of threshold levels which had to 
be reached in China in case of willful trademark counterfeiting9 or copyright piracy is-
sues in order to become subjects to criminal procedures and penalties. Moreover, the 
US also complained about the respective enforcement activities (or lack of it). In these 
regards the US accused China’s institutions and practices to be inconsistent with Arti-
cles 41.1 and 61 of the TRIPS agreement. The arguments focused on the procedural 
rules in China which stated that willful trademark counterfeiting and piracy were only 
supposed to be subject to criminal investigations and penalties if the case was ‘serious’ 
or ‘especially serious’ or the scope was ‘relatively large’ or ‘huge’. These terms were 
not determined by law and with the help of previous judicial interpretations, the US 

8 See also http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm . 
9 On the economics of counterfeited goods see the seminal articles by Grossman & Shapiro (1988a, 1988b). 
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demonstrated that these amounts were usually calculated from the relative prices of 
the infringing materials compared to the legitimate prices which meant that the lower 
the price was, the bigger amount the infringer could sell without risking a criminal 
procedure. Moreover, the US also showed that Chinese regulations only regarded un-
authorized reproduction and unauthorized distribution as illegal activities if these were 
done together, meaning that one of these was accompanied by the other. Following the 
investigation, the panel rejected the claim of the United States ruling that the com-
plainant did not prove that the threshold levels in China allow for an infringement on a 
commercial level. Thus, the respective rules and practices in China were ruled to be 
not inconsistent with the provisions of TRIPS. 
 The second point in the complaint focused on the disposal of works confiscated by the 
Chinese customs authorities due to the infringement of intellectual properties. In this 
regard the US showed that the Chinese authorities were required to put these goods 
back to the channels of commerce (for example by auctions) after removing the in-
fringing features. The US argued that such practices were inconsistent with Articles 46 
and 59 of the TRIPS agreement. After the consultations and examination, the panel 
decided to partially agree with the complaint, concluding that the simple removal of 
the infringing features (e.g. a brand name or symbol) of the confiscated goods before 
putting them back into commercial channels was not consistent with Article 59 of 
TRIPS Agreement. However, regarding the other aspects of this point, the panel con-
cluded that the US had not demonstrated the inconsistency of the Chinese practices 
with the articles of the TRIPS agreement, i.e. it is not per se inconsistent with TRIPS 
to re-introduce counterfeited good into the channels of commerce once the infringing 
character of the confiscated goods has been sufficiently removed or altered. 
 The third main area of the complaint was concentrating on the censorship processes. 
China denied copyright protection and other IPR to works and creations which had not 
yet fully concluded the authorization process. In other words, works that were (still) 
under inspection with the so-called content review system or failed to pass it did not 
enjoy any copyright (etc.). IP owners whose creations had not been authorized in Chi-
na were not able to enforce any rights on these works and creations. The US conclud-
ed that all these issues were inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 9.1, 14 and 41.1 of the 
TRIPS agreement. Following the investigation, the decision of the panel was straight 
and obvious as it upheld the claim and concluded that the existence of the content re-
view system did not provide any justification for denying copyrights and other related 
rights for any works or creations, including such that failed the authorization proce-
dure. So in this regard the panel concluded that China’s laws and practices were in-
consistent with several provisions of the TRIPS agreement. 
In its final report, the panel recommended China to bring its ‘problematic’ regulations into 
conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS agreement. After the final report was pub-
lished, China informed the Dispute Settlement Body that it intended to make the changes re-
quired and that it agreed with the US that the deadline to do so would be the 20th of March, 
2010. One day before the deadline China reported that it had completed all procedures to im-
plement the recommendations. 


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4.2 The US - Copyrights 
The second case is the U.S. – Copyrights case (Pauwelyn 2010: 12, 15, 23-26, 38-39; United 
States 2012 – also for the following).10 On the 26th of January, 1999, the European Communi-
ties requested consultation with the United States in the question of copyrights. They argued 
that certain exemptions under Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act were inconsistent 
with Article 9(1) of the TRIPS agreement which incorporates the obligations that members 
were required to comply with under the Berne Convention. These exemptions allowed under 
certain conditions the amplification of music broadcasts in public areas without authorization 
or the payment of a fee. The European Communities argued that these exemptions were in-
consistent with Article 13 of the TRIPS agreement. 
Following one and a half year of investigation the panel partially upheld the claim of the Eu-
ropean Communities and recommended the U.S. to complete the needed changes in its regula-
tory system to be consistent with the obligations under the TRIPS agreement. 
More detailed, the complaint submitted by the European Communities focused on two exemp-
tions of Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act:
 Sub-paragraph (A) of the Act dealt with the so-called homestyle exemption. This part 
of the regulation provided the possibility for small restaurants and retail outlets to am-
plify music broadcasts without the need for any authorization from the right holders or 
the payment of a fee. However, this exemption was only valid if these public places 
used so-called homestyle equipment, meaning such apparatus which were usually used 
in private homes. In case of this point the panel conducted the investigation and then 
found that the homestyle exemption was not inconsistent with Art. 13 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The panel concluded that the economic impact of the homestyle exemption
was negligible and, thus, in accordance with TRIPS Art. 13, it could be deemed to be a 
limited and special case that does not represent a normal exploitation of the work. 
 The other area under investigation was the sub-paragraph (B) of the Act, containing 
the so-called business exemption which provided the same possibilities for a much 
larger scale of food service and drinking establishments and retail establishments. In 
more details this exemption made it possible for such places to amplify music broad-
casts without permission from the owners of the copyrights and related rights and 
without the payment of a fee if these units did not exceed a certain square footage lim-
it. Moreover establishments larger than this limit could also enjoy the exemption if 
they met given limitations about the equipments used for music broadcasting. In the 
case of the business exemption the panel finally found that it was not consistent with 
Art. 13 of the TRIPS agreement. Their reasoning focused on the fact that most of the 
food service and drinking establishments belonged to the area of this regulation and, 
thus, it does not qualify to be a limited special case. Instead, the business exemption 

10 See also 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS160%FC%2
A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D24A85%2EDOC%2EHTM 
(accessed: 23.01.2012) and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm . 
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exempts a practice of normal exploitation of the music rights from IP protection and 
therefore violates the TRIPS agreement. 
Following the investigation, the final report of the panel was circulated among the members 
on 15 June 2000. In order to implement the recommendations, the United States asked for 15 
months as a reasonable period to complete all procedures. However, as the European Com-
munities did not agree with the length of this period, the final timescale was determined by 
binding arbitration which concluded that the reasonable period for implementation was 12 
months, with the deadline of 27 July 2001. On its meeting three days before the end of the 
reasonable period provided for the U.S., the Dispute Settlement Body and also the European 
Communities agreed to the proposal to extend the period until the end of 2001 or that of the 
current session of the US Congress – whichever was earlier. However, on the 7th of January, 
2002, the U.S. had still not completed all the implementation requirements so the European 
Communities requested authorization to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the 
Dispute Settlement Body. In this regard the European Communities stated that it would fix a 
certain fee from US nationals in connection with border measures regarding copyright works 
to make sure that the benefits of the U.S. from the existence of the business exemption would 
not exceed the nullified or impaired benefits of the European Communities (this amount was 
previously determined by arbitration). A few days later the United States stood against the 
suspensions suggested by the European Communities and also stated that certain principles 
and procedures were not followed. On a meeting on 18th of January, 2002, the parties finally 
agreed on continuing the process with constructive negotiations. Eventually, on the 23rd of 
June 2003, the United States and the European Communities informed the Dispute Settlement 
Body that they had made a mutually satisfactory temporary agreement, covering the period 
until the 20th of December, 2004. This agreement contained the maintenance of the business 
exemption by the U.S. and the annual payment of an impairment compensation for the ongo-
ing violation to the EU. For this three-year-period, the U.S. paid s total of US$ 3.3 million to 
the EU, calculating against the background of the estimated counterfactual royalties that 
would have been collected if the business exemption had not existed (differences-in-
differences approach). However, since that date, the U.S. has neither paid any impairment 
compensation nor withdrawn or reformed the business exemption. Meeting-by-meeting, the 
EU brings the issue up on the agenda of the Dispute Settlement Body and meeting-by-meeting 
the U.S. submits identically phrased (!) reports, stating that it is working on an implementa-
tion of revised rules. The last (85th) such report until date was submitted on the 10th of Janu-
ary, 2012. 
5. International Governance of Intellectual Property Rights: The Limits of 
TRIPS and New Developments 
The US - Copyrights case discussed in the preceding section touches upon a viral topic of 
international IPR protection which is the cross-border enforcement of copyrights, here music 
copyrights. At the same time, it represents a traditional case in the sense that it is not about 
internet or piracy, two phenomena that tend to dominate the debate about cross-border copy-
right enforcement. However, it should not be overlooked that even traditional payment sys-


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tems for copyright owners in entertainment industries remain problematic. The question is: 
how can IPR holders collect their royalties (= enforce their copyrights) abroad, for instance, 
like in this case, if their music is played in restaurants and bars abroad or used in other busi-
ness contexts. In this regard, the WTO procedure in U.S. – Copyrights demonstrates two – 
somewhat contradictory – conclusions: on the one hand, TRIPS is applicable and the panel 
clearly ruled that U.S. practices à la business exemption, denying foreign copyright holders 
their royalties, violate the agreement. On the other hand, nothing substantial appears to have 
happened since the ruling. Instead, the U.S. issues year-by-year exactly the same ‘solution 
delayed’ report to the WTO without actually solving the underlying problem. This does not 
suggest an effective enforcement of the ruling. 
However, one should be cautious to underestimate the TRIPS effect on cross-border copyright 
enforcement. The so-called allofmp3.com case offers an interesting example. The story is 
about a Russian music downloading platform that was long deemed to be legal under Russian 
laws despite selling downloads of foreign copyright owners without offering any (adequate) 
compensation to the IPR holders (Benko 2007). When Russia approached WTO membership, 
its IPR policy was viewed to be a main obstacle to an agreement (Katz & Ocheltree 2006). 
And when such an agreement between the WTO and Russia eventually was on the horizon, 
Russia ‘suddenly’ changed its policy towards allofmp3.com and its related enterprises and 
effectively terminated its business. Although the u-turn in policy and law enforcement was 
not officially put in the context of the upcoming WTO membership, the shadows of TRIPS 
might well have been a trigger for changing a national copyright policy that most likely would 
have led to a lost case in front of the TRIPS panel.11 In other words, the pure existence of 
TRIPS can have a disciplinary effect on members and accession candidates.  
The TRIPS agreement represents a multilateral approach to IPR protection and, thus, already 
a comparatively centralized approach to international IPR governance. However, even though 
the WTO-TRIPS agreements cover 157 member states and, therefore, the big majority of the 
world and of world trade, it is still not a truly global regime. And with a view to internet as 
the medium which appears to be the cornerstone of intellectual property right violations and 
enforcement, having some safe-harbors for server locations outside TRIPS may be sufficient 
to hamper the regulatory effect of TRIPS. It has to be kept in mind that the nature of the com-
bination of the internet as a truly worldwide transmission channel and digitalized products 
(with real copycosts tending towards zero without any loss in quality) implies that even small 
territories outside the scope of WTO/TRIPS may create huge loopholes for cross-border copy-
right enforcement. Talking about copyrights for music, movies, writings and others, already 
few servers outside the WTO-TRIPS jurisdiction may be able to flood the common markets of 
the WTO members with copyright-violating products, thus, de facto eroding any protective 
effect of TRIPS for digitalized products that are traded via the internet. And this would even 
be true if cross-border copyright enforcement within the WTO-TRIPS jurisdiction worked 
perfectly (which represents an heroic assumption as of today). It is the nature of the TRIPS 
agreement that it cannot develop any extraterritorial effects outside the WTO jurisdiction 
(possibly except of countries that aspire to a membership). 

11 Russia eventually became a WTO member state on the 16th of December, 2011. 
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From an economic perspective, a de facto erosion of enforceable commercial copyrights rep-
resents a welfare problem. As has been argued in section 2, an erosion of effective IPR harms 
the incentive to produce new creations in the future and, thus, handicaps and impedes innova-
tion dynamics. Furthermore, the typically discussed trade-off with abuse of market and mo-
nopoly power by the IPR owners tends to be considerably less relevant with commercial cop-
yrights, since these types of IPR tend to exist in competitive settings and do not come along 
with considerable market or even monopoly power (see section 2).12 Consequently, loopholes 
in international governance that enable digital piracy and counterfeited products to flood these 
markets are very likely to be strongly welfare-reducing in their total effects in real-world sce-
narios. Economic analysis shows that imperfect IPR protection can only have positive welfare 
effects, if two assumptions hold: (i) IPR owners enjoy a monopoly-like market position (ac-
cording to a state-of-the-art economic market delineation) and (ii) consumers prefer the origi-
nal over the (illegal) copy. Only if these two assumptions hold, violations of IPR may (but not 
necessarily will) have other than negative welfare effects.13 This is hardly the case with com-
mercial copyrights and would require to be thoroughly demonstrated for exceptional cases. 
Against the background of the preceding paragraphs, it is not surprising that initiatives to cre-
ate an extraterritorial power to enforce copyrights in the internet across borders are currently 
(and controversially) discussed. This goes hand in hand with a re-nationalisation – or re-
decentralisation – of copyright enforcement policies since the TRIPS system is not viewed to 
offer any avenue to close down on the loopholes of copyright enforcement in the digitalized 
internet economy. At the same time, this implies that economically justified (or at least justi-
fiable) cross-border copyright enforcement goals can become mixed with other goals regard-
ing internet governance, such as fighting other internet crimes (like child pornography), re-
ducing the anonymity of internet users, limiting privacy for political or commercial reasons, 
etc. When talking about initiatives like SOPA and PIPA (U.S.), the issue of cross-border cop-
yright protection and enforcement gets easily thrown into the mix of these other implicit or 
explicit goals and while protest and resistance by internet lobby groups is widespread and 
fierce, it is often difficult to disentangle the different elements and to identify whether all 
goals and elements are actually targeted. In order to round the discussion on this paper, we 
will focus exclusively on TRIPS-related elements of the new initiatives and not dive into the 
other issues and goals. 
The PROTECT IP Act (Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act, PIPA) is a proposed law in the United States, introduced in May 
2011. The basic idea of the Act is to give stronger power into the hands of the US Govern-
ment and intellectual property right holders. Besides PIPA, a similar House version of the bill 
also exists, namely the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) which was introduced in October 
2011.14 SOPA and PIPA include TRIPS-relevant provisions insofar as cross-border copyright 
enforcement is concerned. According to these acts, internet sites which are obviously created 

12 This might be different with patents, in particular in the pharmaceutical sector. See e.g. Henry & Stiglitz
(2010). 
13 See again the excellent survey by Belleflamme & Peitz (2012) and their comprehensive references to the litera-
ture. 
14 Both acts are initiatives in discussion and not yet set into force. 

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in order to infringe IPR, in particular by distributing goods illegally or facilitating it or con-
tributing to it, would fall under US jurisdiction irrespective of their place of origin. Thus, the 
new regulations would include a direct extraterritorial reach as soon as domestic markets are 
affected (which in case of the internet is virtually always the case). This approach resembles 
the effects doctrine as known from antitrust laws and competition policy enforcement (inter 
alia, Griffin 1999; Fox 2003; Budzinski 2008).
However, more far-reaching effects would have to be expected from an indirect extraterritori-
al enforcement mechanism incorporated into the acts. All those parties (other websites, ser-
vice providers, advertising agencies, search engines, etc.) who are either in financial relation-
ship with the infringing site or link to it, would have to stop all activities towards the site and 
remove links referring to it (in case of internet providers, they would even have to block ac-
cess to the infringing page).15 In other words, a joint liability of (i) providers, (ii) intermedi-
ates (search engines, archives, data banks, online encyclopedias, etc.), and (iii) commercial 
partners (e.g. advertisers) would be introduced. Furthermore, instead of ‘just’ removing con-
nections to infringing sites on request, these three groups would be required to actively search 
for infringing ‘partners’ and proactively employ the required sanctions on them. Once again, 
all these regulations would also be valid for sites which are registered outside the US, creating 
an indirect extraterritorial enforcement channel. 
These unilateral extraterritorial enforcement mechanisms may stand in conflict at least with 
the idea of TRIPS. On the one hand, this refers to the intended role of providers and  interme-
diates as auxiliary policemen of copyright enforcement. On the other hand, an extraterritorial 
reach of US copyright protection policy would limit or even erode the national copyright rule-
making competence above the TRIPS minimum standards of WTO member states.16 Assum-
ing that the intended enforcement mechanisms would be effective, US copyright rules would 
prevail worldwide (at least, this appears to be part of the intention), thus, offering no scope for 
differing national regulations ‘on top’ of the minimum standards. Different stages of devel-
opment but also cultural issues, however, may render a diversity of national copyright protec-
tion and enforcement on top of the minimum standards efficient and beneficial. It is rather 
doubtful if a one-size-fits-all approach through unilateral extraterritorial enforcement corre-
sponds to individual levels of satisfying commercial copyright protection – in particular when 
discussing design elements on top of worldwide agreed minimum standards.17
From an economic perspective, additional disadvantages of recidivism to unilateral strategies 
to enforce commercial copyrights include negative externalities from unilateral initiatives 
(seeking to maximize national welfare and not international welfare, thus favoring beggar-

15 Besides these regulations, the new laws would expand the criminal regulations and include the streaming of 
copyright materials. 
16 There may also be a conflict with commitments in the context of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). Since 1998, the field of intellectual property rights in the US is regulated by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) which came into force in order to fulfill the responsibilities of the US towards two 
treaties of WIPO, namely the Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  
17 In addition, worries are voiced concerning fundamental principles of the rule of law, the protection of privacy 
as well as the protection of free speech and diversity of opinions. They are however not discussed in our con-
text.  
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my-neighbor strategies), jurisdictional conflicts and disincentives for technology transfer and 
cross-border IP-related investments.  
6. Conclusion 
Our review of the hitherto intellectual property rights policy within the WTO framework 
shows that in particular the problem of the cross-border enforcement of commercial copy-
rights represents as well as remains a challenge and plays an important role in landmark 
TRIPS cases. Even in more traditional media markets the TRIPS provisions and procedures 
cannot efficiently solve cross-border commercial copyright under-enforcement as the US-
Copyrights case demonstrates. At the same time, its reflection in the current discussion topics 
of the – politically-dominated – TRIPS rounds appears to be surprisingly underrepresented 
and outshone by political topics with strong political lobby influences like geographic indica-
tions, technology transfer or biodiversity (see section 3.2). This represents a problematic de-
velopment, especially in the light of the current re-emergence of unilateral initiatives to 
strengthen the cross-border enforcement of commercial copyrights by several nations, includ-
ing plans to establish extraterritorial enforcement of national copyrights rules. From an eco-
nomic point of view, turning away from the multilateral approach within the WTO framework 
(TRIPS) – but also from other multilateral forums like WIPO – represents a problematic ten-
dency that can be expected to be less favorable from a world welfare perspective than rein-
forcing the commitment to multilateral solutions, reformed and adjusted to the new digital 
media challenges, even though such a process is guaranteed to be anything else than easy. 
Potential conflicts of those unilateral initiatives with TRIPS (and WIPO) provisions are likely 
to cause further problems and complications in the cross-border enforcement of commercial 
copyrights.
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